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Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study
Abstract

The case of Reibl v. Hughes has significantly altered the law regarding informed consent in Canada. It might be
expected, therefore, that its impact on the Canadian medical profession would be significant. However, in the
first study to examine the practice of Canadian doctors in this respect, Professor Robertson concludes that the
profession is largely unaware of either the decision or its importance. Further, the study examines doctors'
current perceptions and opinions on the disclosure of risks to patients and the results, among others, raise
serious questions regarding both the awareness and reception of important legal rulings.
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INFORMED CONSENT IN CANADA: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY
By GERALD B. ROBERTSON*
The case of Reibl v. Hughes has significantly altered the law regarding informed consent in Canada. It might be expected, therefore, that its impact on
the Canadian medical profession would be significant. However, in the first
study to examine the practice of Canadian doctors in this respect, Professor
Robertson concludes that the profession is largely unaware of either the decision or its importance. Further, the study examines doctors' current perceptions
and opinions on the disclosure of risks to patients and the results, among
others, raise serious questions regardingboth the awareness and reception of
important legal rulings.

This article presents the results of an empirical study conducted in
1982 concerning informed consent and medical practice in Canada.
The aims of the study were three-fold, namely:
1)
2)
3)

To assess the impact on medical practice of the Supreme
Court of Canada decision in Reibl v. Hughes;1
To assess Canadian doctors' own perceptions of how they
conduct their practice with regard to informed consent;
and,
To assess the views of Canadian doctors on issues relevant to
informed consent.

Although a number of empirical studies concerning informed consent
have been conducted in the United States,2 no such study appears to
0 Copyright, 1984, G.B. Robertson.

* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. I am grateful to Dr.
J.G. Kaplan, Vice-President (Research) of the University of Alberta, and to the Faculty of Law of
the University of Alberta, for arranging financial assistance for this project. I also wish to thank
Tim Hurlburt, 3rd year student in the Faculty of Law, for his valuable work as research assistant,
and the Corporationprofessionelle des medecins du Quebec for kindly endorsing the study.
I [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880.
2 The most recent are those conducted on behalf of the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research, and published as an
appendix to the Commission's Report 2 Making Health Care Decisions, (1982); see also Rosoff,
Informed Consent (1982); Faden et aL, DisclosureStandardsand Informed Consent (1981), 6 J.
Health Politics, Pol'y & L. 255; Hagman, The Medical Patient'sRights to Know: Report on a
Medical-Legal-EthicalEmpiricalStudy (1970), 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 758; Hershy and Bushkoff,
Informed Consent Study (1969); Kaufmann, Informed Consent and Patient Decisionmaking
(1981), 4 Int. J. L. & Psych. 345; Alfidi, Opinion, Controversy, Alternatives and Decisions in
Complying with the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent (1975), 114 Radiology 231; Alfidi, Informed Consent - A Study of Patient Reaction (1971), 216 J.A.M.A. 1325; Rosenberg, Informed
Consent - A Reappraisalof Patients' Reactions (1973), 119 Cal. Med. 64. For a critical review of
many of these studies, see Meisel and Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of Emperical Studies (1983), 25 Ariz. L. Rev. 265.
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have been carried out in Canada.
Since the main goal was to assess the impact of a legal decision on
medical practice, the study is focused on the aspect of informed consent
with which the law is primarily concerned, namely disclosure of risks to
patients.' Thus the present study is more a measure of the extent of
disclosure of risks, than of the extent to which doctors involve patients
in decisions affecting their care and treatment.
I. THE DECISION IN REIBL V. HUGHES
From the point of view of medical practice, the significance of
Reibl v. Hughes lies in its enunciation of the test to be applied in determining what information a doctor is required to disclose to his patient.
Of particular importance is the apparent adoption of a "reasonable patient" test in preference to the traditional "reasonable doctor" test.4
Doctors must now take into consideration what they know or ought to
know their patients would want to be told. The theoretical importance
of Reibl v. Hughes has led several commentators to assume that the
decision will have an equivalent practical importance. For example, the
General Counsel to the Canadian Medical Protective Association has
observed that: "No legal event in the last fifty years has so disturbed
the practice of medicine as did the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Reibl v. Hughes."5 In a similar vein, Linden J. has remarked that: "The ultimate effect of [Reibl v. Hughes] should be medical practitioners who are even more sensitive, concerned and humane
than they now are. Moreover, the doctor-patient relationship should be
improved greatly by the better communication between doctors and
their patients." 6 As will be seen below, the results of the empirical
3 "[Tihe laws near-exclusive focus on the disclosure of risks - which has often led to standardized forms and recitations of risks, but not to a full dialogue with patients - has had an
unfortunate impact on the very objectives the informed consent process is designed to achieve.
Further, this preoccupation with risks is undoubtedly responsible for much of the medical community's skepticism about informed consent." Making Health Care Decisions,supra note 2, vol. 1 at
69; see also Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale?: Law's Vision (1977), 39 U. Pa. L. Rev. 137.
4 Although the Supreme Court in Reibl v. Hughes and in Hopp v. Lepp, [1980] 2 S.C.R.
192 did not expressly adopt the "reasonable patient" test, the two decisions have generally been
interpreted as having done so. See, e.g., White v. Turner (1981), 120 D.L.R. (3d) 269 at 283
(Ont. S.C.), affd 14 May 1982 (unreported)(O.C.A.); Rawlings v. Lindsay (1982), 20 C.C.L.T.
301 at 306 (B.C.S.C.); Picard, Consent to Medical Treatment in Canada (1981), 19 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 140; Somerville, Structuring the Issues in Informed Consent (1981), 26 McGill L.J.
740; Rodgers-Magnet, Recent Developments In the Doctrine of Informed Consent to Medical
Treatment (1981), 14 C.C.L.T. 61; Gochnauer & Fleming, Case Comment. (1981), 15 U.B.C.L.
Rev. 475.
5 Canadian Medical Protective Association Annual Report (1981) at 39.
6 White v. Turner, supra note 4, at 290.
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study cast considerable doubt on the validity of these assertions.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection and QuestionnaireDesign7

A.

The study consisted of a seven-page questionnaire which was sent
in June 1982 to 1,000 surgeons throughout Canada. The sample was
restricted to those engaged in surgical practice, given that the issue of
disclosure of risks to patients is generally more relevant to surgeons
than to general practitioners. Names were chosen by random selection
from the Canadian Medical Directory. The study was further confined
to issues involving patients having capacity to give valid consent; the
questionnaire therefore defined the term "patient" as meaning a conscious, sane, adult patient. Paediatric surgeons were accordingly excluded from the sample.
The first part of the questionnaire obtained demographic information from which it was possible to group and compare responses on the
basis of the following variables - age, type of practice (for example,
sole practitioner, partnership), size of community, specialist field, and
province. The percentage of surgeons in each group is shown in the
following table.

7

The following works were relied upon in designing the questionnaire and in promoting a

high response rate - Hoinville et aL, Survey Research Practice (1978); Berdie and Anderson,
Questionnaires:Design and Use (1974); Moser and Kalton, Survey Methods in Social Investigation (2nd ed., 1971); Kanuk and Berenson, Mail Surveys and Response Rates: 4 LiteratureReview (1975), 12 J. Marketing Research 440; Linsky, StimulatingResponses to Mailed Questionnaires (1975), 39 Pub. Opinion Q. 82; Gough and Hall, A Comparisonof Physicians Who Did or
Did Not Respond to a Postal Questionnaire (1977), 62 J. Applied Psych. 777; Blumberg et al.,
Response Rates in Postal Surveys (1974), 38 Pub. Opinion Q. 113.
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TABLE A
Analysis of Respondents (n=620) According to Age, Type of
Practice, Size of Community, Specialist Field, and Province
Age
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+

Specialist Field

1%
21%
35%
31%
12%

Type of Practice
Single
Partnership
Other

61%
33%
6%

Size of Community
Less than 25,000
25,000-100,000
100,011-300,000
More than 300,000

8%
20%
24%
48%

General Surgery
Orthopaedic
Urology
ENT
Ophthamology
Neurosurgery
Plastic Surgery
Cardio/Vascular

40%
16%
8%
9%
14%
4%
5%
4%

Province
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
Quebec
New Brunswick
Nova Scotia
Newfoundland & P.E.I.

15%
8%
5%
4%
34%
26%
3%
4%
1%

There were some, but not many, significant differences in answers
within these groups, and these will be noted below.
B. Response Rate and Bias
Six hundred and twenty (620) completed questionnaires were returned, representing a response rate of sixty-five percent." This relatively high response rate,9 achieved primarily by means of two followup letters sent to those who did not initially respond, reduces the
chance of non-response bias, that is, the possibility that those who did
8 The initial sample of 1000 was reduced to 960 by excluding questionnaires returned by
those no longer engaged in surgical practice or by those engaged in paediatric surgery; these
respondents were considered to fall outside the scope of the sample (see Hoinville el aL, Id. at 71).
Thus 620 completed questionnaires were returned out of a total of 960, representing a response
rate of 65%.
* Two recent studies in the United States (Rosoff, supra note 2, and Faden el al., supra note

2) had response rates of 24% and 34% respectively.
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not respond would have answered significantly differently from those
who did respond. 10 The only characteristic which was known about
those who did not respond was the province in which they practised.
Analysis using this information revealed no evidence of non-response
bias. In other words, the response rate, perhaps unexpectedly,"1 was
approximately the same in all the provinces.
Given its nature, however, the study inevitably involves an element
of non-response bias. It is reasonable to assume that those who took the
trouble to respond to the questionnaire were more interested in its subject matter than those who did not."2 Those with an interest in informed consent are more likely to have heard of Reibl v. Hughes and
are possibly more likely to disclose information to their patients. Thus
this study probably exaggerates the extent to which Canadian surgeons
are aware of the Supreme Court's decision, and the extent to which
they disclose information to their patients. This is accentuated by the
possibility that certain answers were perceived by some respondents to
be "acceptable". 13 Thus, there may have been a reluctance on the part
of some respondents to admit the withholding of information from patients or of being unaware of the decision in Reibl v. Hughes. Once
again this leads to an exaggeration of the impact of the decision and
the extent of disclosure of information to patients.
III. THE IMPACT OF REIBL V. HUGHES
A.

Awareness of the Decision

To suggest that a judicial decision will have an impact on medical
practice assumes that the medical profession is aware of the existence
of that decision. The present study tested the validity of that assumption with respect to Reibl v. Hughes by asking the following question:
Have you heard of a recent Supreme Court of Canada case (called Reibl v.
Hughes) dealing with 'informed consent' to medical treatment?

10 See generally, Hoinville et al., supra note 7, at 5-6 and 136-38; Moser and Kalton, supra
note 7, at 166 et seq.; Gough and Hall, supra note 7.
"I A significantly higher than average response rate might have been expected from surgeons
in Alberta and Quebec, because (a) the study was associated with the University of Alberta and
(b) questionnaires sent to Quebec surgeons were accompanied by a letter of endorsement from the
Corporationprofessionelle des medecins du Quebec. This, however, does not mean that the letter
of endorsement had no effect on the response rate from Quebec; it may have raised to average
what would otherwise have been a less than average response rate, particularly given that all
questionnaires were in English. Enclosing the letter of endorsement with all questionnaires sent to
Quebec thereby precluded an assessment of its effect.
12 See Faden et aL, supra note 2, at 170.
13 Id. at 271.
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This resulted in one of the study's most significant findings, namely
that seventy-four percent of the doctors who responded to the survey
answered this question in the negative. Given the probable element of
response bias discussed above, the number of surgeons who are unaware of the decision in Reibl v. Hughes is probably even greater than
seventy-four percent. The implications of this finding will be discussed
14
below.
A comparison of the answers within each group revealed significant variation. A much higher percentage of neurosurgeons (sixty percent) and surgeons in Ontario (thirty-nine percent) were aware of the
Supreme Court decision. The former, and to some extent the latter, can
be explained by the fact that the defendent in Reibi v. Hughes was a
neurosurgeon practising in that province. The greater awareness of the
decision amongst Ontario surgeons may also be due to the active steps
which were taken by the Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons to
bring the decision to the attention of its members.1 5 Other findings of
significant variation were that a much lower percentage of urologists
(fourteen percent) and doctors over the age of sixty (eight percent)
were aware of Reibi v. Hughes.
A few respondents identified what they considered to be a weakness in the wording of the above question. These respondents observed
that the information contained in the question (the name of the case,
and the fact that it was a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada dealing with informed consent) was insufficient for them to decide whether they had heard of the case. These respondents would have
wished a summary of the facts of the case to help them identify it. It is
unlikely, however, that this aspect of the question will have caused any
significant error in the results. However, there is another aspect of this
issue which must be considered, namely that some respondents, although unaware of the Supreme Court decision, may have been influenced by it unknowingly. For example, some respondents indicated that
they had recently changed their practice with regard to informing patients because of recommendations issued by the hospital with which
they were associated. These recommendations may have been generated by Reibl v. Hughes. An attempt was made to assess the extent of
this type of indirect influence, and this will be discussed below. 16
14 Section

V, infra.

15 See, College Notices, Issue No. 3 (1982), referred to in Wright and Linden, Canadian
Tort Law: Cases, Notes & Materials (1983 Supplement) at 33.
16 Section III E, infra.
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B. Source of Awareness
Those who indicated having heard of Reibl v. Hughes were asked
how they had learned of the case. Seventy-five percent identified media
coverage or medical literature as being the source of their knowledge,
including thirteen percent who specifically referred to the Annual Report of the Canadian Medical Protective Association. 17 Other sources
included medical colleagues (eight percent), medico-legal meetings
(eight percent), lawyers (six percent) and personal acquaintance with
Dr. Hughes (six percent).18
C.

Extent of Knowledge

Those who indicated having heard of Reibl v. Hughes were also
asked what they recalled was decided in that case. In processing these
answers it proved possible to group them into three different categories
according to their appreciation of the importance of the decision. The
first group (twenty percent) had no recollection of what was decided.
The second group (forty-five percent) comprised those answers which
were confined to the actual facts of the case; for example, answers such
as "the doctor was found negligent in not disclosing the risk of a
stroke." The third group, a minority of thirty-five percent, indicated an
awareness of the importance of the decision; for example, answers such
as "the decision increases doctors' responsibility in obtaining informed
consent," or "doctors must now take account of what their patients
would want to know." 19
D.

The Perceived Effect

Having isolated those doctors who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes,
the questionnaire then proceeded to determine whether they perceived
the decision as having had any effect on their practice with regard to
informing patients. In particular they were asked whether their knowledge of the case had generally led them to:
(1) give more or less information than before to their patients
17 The 1981 Annual Report contained a detailed account of Reibi v. Hughes by the Association's General Counsel, in addition to suggested guidelines on how to meet the legal requirements
enunciated by the Supreme Court - see, supra note 5, at 27-28 and 39-46.

18 Some respondents identified more than one source, hence the total is greater than 100

percent. Ten percent of the respondents could not remember how they had learned of Reibl v.
Hughes.
19 Included in this third group were those doctors (9 %) who, whilst appreciating the importance of Reibl v. Hughes, exaggerated its effect. A typical answer in this group was that "doctors
must now inform their patients of all possible complications, however slight."
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about risks involved in proposed surgical operations;
spend more or less time than before with their patients discussing risks involved in proposed surgical operations; and,
(3) ask their patients more or fewer questions than before when
discussing risks involved in proposed surgical operations.
In relation to each of these questions the respondents were asked to
circle one of the following answers: "considerably more," "more,"
"less," "considerably less," and "no difference." Respondents were also
asked whether their knowledge of the case had had any other effect on
their practice with regard to informing patients. An analysis of the answers is shown in the following table.
(2)

TABLE B
Analysis of the Perceived Effect of Reibl v. Hughes
on Surgeons Aware of the Decision (n = 159)
% of Surgeons21
Nature of the Effect2 °
More or Considerably More
Information Given
More or Considerably More
Time Spent
More or Considerably More
Questions Asked
No Change

53%
42%
34%
41%

It can be seen from the above that fifty-nine percent of doctors
who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes regarded the decision as having
had some effect on their practice with regard to informing patients.
The most commonly cited effect (fifty-three percent) was the giving of
more information to patients about risks involved in proposed surgery.
The decision was also perceived by a minority of doctors as having increased the amount of time spent discussing risks with patients, and
also the number of questions they ask patients during such discussions.
A small number of doctors (ten percent) also indicated that their
knowledge of the decision had led them to increase the amount of documentation involved in obtaining their patients' "informed" consent; for
None of the respondents indicated that Reibl v. Hughes had resulted in a decrease in the
amount of information given, time spent or questions asked.
"1 Many of the respondents indicated that Reibi v. Hughes had had more than one effect on
their practice; for example, it had led to them giving more information and spending more time
with patients. Hence the total figure in this column exceeds 100%.
20
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example, greater use of written consent forms, written information on
risks involved in proposed surgery, and detailed written records of discussions with patients.
It should be stressed that these answers provide an indication only
of the respondents' own subjective assessment of the effect of Reibl v.
Hughes on their practice of informing patients. Moreover, the answers
are limited to an indication of relative change; they may show that
more information is being given than before, but they cannot show how
much information is now being given. Later parts of the questionnaire,
discussed below, 22 attempt to introduce a more objective assessment of
the effect of the decision on medical practice.
It is nevertheless significant to note that forty-one percent of doctors who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes indicated that the decision had
had no effect on their practice with regard to informing patients. One
of three possible conclusions can be drawn from this. First, it may be
that the decision has had an effect on these doctors, but they are unaware of it. As will be discussed below, 23 answers to other parts of the
questionnaire militate against this conclusion and confirm that the Supreme Court decision had little or no effect on this section of the sample. Second, it may be that the practice of these doctors with regard to
informing patients was such that no change was necessary to meet the
legal requirements enunciated in Reibl v. Hughes. Once again, answers
to later parts of the questionnaire suggest otherwise. The third conclusion and, it is submitted the correct one, is that this study demonstrates
that Reibl v. Hughes failed to have any impact on forty-one percent of
the doctors who had heard of the decision. 24 When this is taken in conjunction with the percentage of respondents unaware of the decision, it
is possible to concluded that Reibl v. Hughes has had no effect on the
practice of approximately eighty-five percent of surgeons in Canada.
Answers to this question also revealed no significant difference as
between respondents who appreciated the importance of Reibl v.
Hughes25 and those who did not. Thirty-nine percent of the former,
22 Section IV B, infra.
22 Id.
24 One qualification should be added to this conclusion. The group of doctors who regarded
their knowledge of the decision as having had no effect on their practice contained a significantly

higher percentage of those who were unable to recollect what the case had decided (34% as compared with 20%). This tends to suggest that this group may have included some doctors who,

despite their answer to the contrary, were unaware of the Supreme Court decision. To the extent

that this is true it would have the effect of overestimating the extent of awareness of Reibl v.

Hughes amongst Canadian surgeons, while underestimating its effect on those who were aware of
the decision.
21 Section III C, supra.
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compared with forty-two percent of the latter, indicated that Reibl v.
Hughes had had no effect on their practice. The significance of this
finding will be discussed below.26
E.

The Impact of Other Factors

In discussing the impact of Reibl v. Hughes, whether perceived or
actual, two additional considerations are relevant. The first is the possibility that respondents who were unaware of the decision may have
been influenced by the decision unknowingly. The second is that
changes in the practices and opinions of respondents who were aware of
Reibl v. Hughes may have been attributable, at least in part, to factors
other than their knowledge of the decision. In order to take account of
these possibilities, the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate
whether their practice with regard to informing patients had changed
since 1980 for any reason other than their knowledge of Reibi v.
Hughes.
Of respondents who were unaware of the case, fifteen percent indicated that their practice with regard to informing patients had changed
since 1980, in the sense that they now gave more information to patients than before. The reasons given for this change were analyzed in
order to identify those which could be construed as being a result of the
Supreme Court decision. The following reasons for change were identified as capable of such interpretation, namely, professional literature
and meetings, media coverage of informed consent, and changes in hospital policy. However, only three percent of respondents cited any of
these reasons for their change in practice. The reason most commonly
given was personal involvement in litigation (either as a defendant or as
an expert witness) or a perceived increase in litigation. Thus it appears
that the possibility of respondents being unaware of the impact of Reibl
v. Hughes on their practice is slight.
Of respondents who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes, thirty-two
percent indicated that factors other than their knowledge of the decision (most commonly personal involvement in litigation or a perceived
increase in litigation) had changed their practice with regard to informing patients. This finding does not affect the above discussion of
the perceived impact of Reibl v. Hughes, assuming that respondents
were able to distinguish between changes attributable to their knowledge of the case and changes due to other factors. To the extent that
" Section V, infra.
2Section

III A, supra.
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this assumption is incorrect, the above discussion will have exaggerated
the perceived impact of the Supreme Court decision. Moreover, in later
parts of this article, inferences will be drawn as to the impact of Reibl
v. Hughes on respondents' attitudes towards disclosure of risks; 28 this
impact may also be exaggerated, given that variations in attitudes as
between respondents aware, and those unaware of the decision, may be
attributable to factors other than the impact of the Supreme Court
decision.
IV.
A.

MEDICAL PRACTICE AND DISCLOSURE OF RISKS
Doctor's Perceptions of their Practice

Part of the questionnaire was designed to ascertain doctors' own
perceptions of their practice with regard to informing patients of risks
involved in proposed surgery. Respondents were asked the following
question:
Do you (or someone on your behalf) inform your patient of all serious, unusual
or special risks, if any, involved in a proposed surgical operation?
An analysis of the answers is shown in the following Table.
TABLE C
Analysis of Respondents' Views of How Often they Disclose "Serious,
Unusual or Special Risks" to their Patients
Always/Often

Sometimes

Rarely/Never

All Respondents
(n=620)

75%

15%

10%

Respondents Unaware
of Reibl v. Hughes
(n=461)

72%

17%

11%

Respondents Aware
of Reibl v. Hughes
(n= 159)9

83%

9%

7%

A number of qualifications must be added to the above data. First,
the term "special and unusual risks" was chosen to reflect the language

used by the Supreme Court in Hopp v. Lepp30 and reiterated in Reibl
Section IV B, infra.
One percent of these respondents answered "Don't Know" to this question.
30 Supra note 4, at 210.
15
29
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v. Hughes, 1 but it is not a term which is easily defined.3 2 Consequently
it may have been interpreted differently amongst the respondents.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that the answers to the above question reflect what doctors claim they do, and are unlikely to provide a
reliable indication of what doctors actually do.38 As one study observes:
"Regarding health care, surveys are known to overstate the frequency
with which information is disclosed and may present a rosier, more homogenous picture of medical practice than an on-site investigation of
the same population would."'" The results are in line with previous
studies,35 in that they indicate that a high percentage of doctors claim
that they usually (that is, either always or often) inform patients of
risks involved in proposed surgery.
It is of interest to note the significant variation in answers as between respondents who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes and those who
were not. A significantly higher percentage of the former claimed that
they usually disclosed serious, unusual or special risks to patients.
Since, as was noted above, this question was concerned only with doctors' own perceptions of what they do, this variation cannot necessarily
be taken as reflecting an impact of Reibl v. Hughes on the frequency of
disclosure. The most that can be inferred is that the decision appears to
have had some affect on what doctors claim they do with regard to
informing patients of risks involved in proposed surgery.
Finally it should be noted that eighty-five percent of all respondents indicated that when they informed patients of risks involved in
proposed surgery, they always did so personally rather than delegating
the task to others such as nursing staff or junior colleagues. When
taken in conjunction with those who indicated that they "often" gave
the information personally, this figure increased to ninety-nine percent.
Once again this finding confirms those of previous studies conducted in
the United States.88 In the words of one writer:
[t]his is surprising, since it is a widespread impression that surgeons often
allow house-staff physicians (that is, surgical residents) to do preoperative workups of their patients, including the task of explaining to the patients various as, Supra note 1, at 884.
An attempt was made by Linden J. in White v. Turner, supra note 4, at 285, and by
McLachlin J.in Rmlings v. Lindsay, supra note 4, at 306.
See Rosoff, supra note 2, at 329.
Making Health Care Decisions, supra note 2, vol. 1 at 9.
See Rosoff, supra note 2, at 343; Making Health Care Decisions, supra note 2, vol. 1 at
79. In a questionnaire study conducted by the author in 1981 of 302 surgeons in England (response rate = 72%) 78% of respondents indicatid that they usually informed patients of all serious, unusual or special risks involved in proposed surgery.
" See Rosoff, supra note 2, at 351; Faden et al., supra note 2, at 269.
32
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pects of the upcoming operations. Moreover, with a large proportion of surgical

treatment provided on a referral basis, it might be assumed that much of the
necessary information would be provided to the patient by the referring physi-

cian, thus relieving the surgeon of some of this burden. Judging from the responses . . . neither of these factors seems to have much impact.37

B. Doctor's Opinions on Disclosure of Risks
As was explained above, information concerning what doctors
claim they do with regard to disclosing risks to patients is of limited
use, particularly as it is unlikely to provide a reliable indication of what
doctors actually do in practice. Accordingly, an attempt was made to
obtain a more objective assessment of doctors' practice by seeking their
views on a number of issues relating to disclosure of risks to patients.
This approach was based on the premise that inferences concerning
doctors' practice may legitimately be drawn from their views on informed consent, and that these inferences are likely to provide a more
reliable indication of what is done in practice than information based
on what doctors claim they do. This part of the questionnaire was also
aimed at obtaining a more reliable indication of the impact of Reibl v.
Hughes.
Respondents were presented with a number of statements concerning disclosure or risks to patients, and were asked whether they agreed
or disagreed with each of these statements. Of particular importance
were two statements which go to the root of the decision in Reibl v.
Hughes. The first of these was as follows:
The decision whether to inform a patient of any of the risks involved in a proposed surgical operation is entirely a matter for the clinical judgment of the doctor or doctors involved in the case.

An analysis of the reaction to this statement is show in the following
Table.

.7

Rosoff, id.
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TABLE D
Respondents' Views on the Above Statement
Agree

Disagree

Don't Know

All Respondents
(n = 620)

55%

44%

1%

Respondents Unaware of
Reibl v. Hughes (n = 461)

56%

43%

1%

Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes (n = 159)

50%

49%

1%

Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes and
indicating that it had had
some effect on their
practice (n = 94)

44%

54%

2%

Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes and
indicating that it had had
no effect on their
practice (n = 65)

60%

40%

0%

Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes and
indicating an appreciation
of its importance
(n = 54)38

41%

59%

0%

Respondents were also asked for their views on the following
statement:
In deciding whether to inform a patient of a particular risk involved in a proposed surgical operation, a doctor should be guided more by what he or she
thinks the patient ought to know than by what he or she thinks the patient would
want to know.

An analysis of the reaction to this statement is shown in the following
Table.

38 Section III C, supra.
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TABLE E
Respondents' Views on the Above Statement
All Respondents
(n = 620)
Respondents Unaware of
Reibl v. Hughes (n = 461)
Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes (n = 159)
Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes and
indicating that it had had
some effect on their
practice (n = 94)
Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes and
indicating that it had had
no effect on their
practice (n = 65)
Respondents Aware of
Reibl v. Hughes and
indicating an appreciation
of its importance
(n = 54)39

Agree
57%

Disagree Don't Know
38%
5%

60%

35%

5%

48%

45%

7%

46%

47%

7%

52%

41%

7%

52%

41%

7%

Important inferences may be drawn from Tables D and E as to
doctors' views on disclosure of risks and also as to the impact of Reibl
v. Hughes. It can be seem that a majority of respondents (fifty-five
percent) took the view that the decision whether to disclose risks to a
patient is entirely a matter for the doctor's clinical judgment.4 0 Moreover, a slightly higher percentage (fifty-seven percent) agreed that in
making the decision a doctor should be guided more by what he thinks
his patient ought to be told than by what he thinks his patient would
want to be told. These two views are the antithesis of what was said in
Reibl v. Hughes, as can be seen from the following extract from the
39

Id.

In the author's study of surgeons in England, supra note 35, 83% of respondents agreed
with this view.
40
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judgment of Laskin C.J.C.:41
I think the Ontario Court of Appeal went too far, when dealing with the standard of disclosure of risks, in saying

. . .

that 'the manner in which the nature

and degree of risk is explained to a particular patient is best left to the judgment
of the doctor in dealing with the man before him.' Of course, it can be tested by
expert medical evidence but that too is not determinative

. .

. What the doctor

knows or should know that the particular patient deems relevant to a decision
whether to undergo prescribed treatment goes equally to his duty of disclosure as
do the material risks recognized as a matter of required medical knowledge ...
The issue under consideration is a different issue from that involved where the
question is whether the doctor carried out his professional activities by applicable
professional standards. What is under consideration here is the patient's right to
know what risks are involved in undergoing or foregoing certain surgery or other
treatment.

Reibl v. Hughes represents a fundamental change in judicial attitudes
towards informed consent. Disclosure of risks is no longer an issue

within the exclusive domain of the clinical judgment of the medical
profession. It is no longer a question of what the individual doctor, or
the medical community as a whole, decides the patient ought to be
told. It is a question of the patient's right to be informed, measured by
what the doctor knows or ought to know the patient would want to be
told. The present study suggests that a majority of surgeons in Canada
have not recognized this fundamental change.
Tables D and E also confirm the doubts already expressed as to
the reliability of doctors' perceptions of their own practice with regard
to disclosure of risks. Table E suggests that a majority of surgeons
adopt a highly paternalistic approach, being guided more by what they
believe the patient ought to be told than what they believe he would
want to be told. Data obtained from other parts of the questionnaire,
considered below,4 2 provides further evidence of this paternalism. Table
D suggests that a majority of surgeons view the issue of disclosure of
risks entirely in terms of their own clinical judgment, rather than, for
example, in terms of the patient's interest in self-determination and his
right to be informed. It extremely difficult to regard these views as consistent with the claim made by most respondents that they usually inform their patients of all the serious, unusual or special risks involved
in proposed surgery.
It should be noted, however, that Reibl v. Hughes appears to have
had some impact on opinions expressed by respondents. It will be recalled that fifty-five percent of all respondents agreed with the statement
that the decision whether to inform a patient of any of the risks in41

Supra note 1, at 894 - 95.

4

Section IV C, infra.
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volved in proposed surgery is entirely a matter for the doctor's clinical
judgment. However, as is shown in Table D, only fifty percent of respondents who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes agreed with the statement. Moreover, of respondents who were aware of the decision and
who indicated that it had had some effect on their practice, only fortyfour percent agreed with the statement. A similar pattern of results is
evident from Table E with respect to whether a doctor should be
guided more by what he thinks his patient ought to know than by what
his patient would want to know. It appears, therefore, that Reibl v.
Hughes may have had some impact on doctors' attitudes, in the sense
that those who were aware of the decision and were conscious of it
having changed their practice, were more likely to hold views consistent
with those expressed in the case. It should be stressed, however, that
the extent of this impact is small. Moreover, it should be noted that
this variation in result may not necessarily be due entirely to the influence of the case, since, as was discussed above, 43 the possibility exists
that factors other than Reibl v. Hughes may have influenced respondents' opinions on the issue of disclosure of risks to patients.
Tables D and E also indicate only a slight variation in answers as
between respondents who appreciated the importance of Reibl v.
Hughes44 and those who did not. The significance of this finding will be
discussed below.45
Finally, it was noted above that forty-one percent of respondents
who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes indicated that it had had no effect
on their practice with regard to disclosing risks to patients. 46 The results shown in Table D, and to a lesser extent those in Table E, confirm
that the decision has had little or no effect on these respondents. Their
views on the two statements were more in line with those of respondents who were unaware of Reibl v. Hughes than with those respondents who indicated that they were aware of the decision and that it
had had some effect on their practice.
C.

FactorsInfluencing Disclosure of Risks

The present section is concerned with identifying those factors
which surgeons regard as important in deciding whether to inform a
patient of a particular risk involved in proposed surgery. Respondents
were presented with a list of factors and were asked the following
43 Section III E, supra.

44 Section III C, supra.
45 Section V, infra.
46 Table B, supra.
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question:
In deciding whether to inform your patient of a particular risk involved in a
proposed surgical operation, how important are the following factors?

Relative importance was measure by means of a "semantic differential
scale; ' 47 respondents were asked to indicate relative importance by circling a number on a numerical scale from one to five, number one representing "unimportant" and number five representing "very important." Results were processed and the mean calculated for each of the
given factors. This calculation was done for each of three groups; the
first comprised all respondents, the second comprised respondents who
were unaware of Reibl v. Hughes, and the third group comprised respondents who were aware of the decision. The factors were then arranged in order of importance as indicated by their mean. The results
are shown in the following Table.

4'

See Moser and Kalton, supra note 7, at 373-76.
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TABLE F
Analysis of Relative Importance Given to Various Factors in Deciding
Whether to Inform Patients of a Risk Involved in Proposed Surgery, Based
on a Scale From 1 (unimportant) to 5 (very important)
Respondents Respondents
All
Aware of
Unaware of
Respondents Reibl v.
Reibl v.
Hughes
Hughes
Factors
(n=620)
(n=159)
(n=461)
Seriousness of damage to
4.44 (1)*
4.58 (1)
4.40 (2)
patient if risk were to
materialize
What you consider to be in
4.34 (2)
4.11 (5)
4.42 (1)
your patient's best interests
The prognosis without the
4.28 (3)
4.17 (4)
4.32 (3)
surgery
The chances of the risk
4.26 (4)
4.46 (2)
4.19 (5)
materializing
The fact that the patient has 4.22 (5)
4.23 (3)
4.22 (4)
asked about the risk
Patient's apparent ability to
3.83 (6)
3.90 (6)
3.81 (6)
understand an explanation of
the risk
The fact that patient would
3.74 (7)
3.76 (7)
3.73 (7)
probably regard the risk as
relevant to his decision
The knowledge that if you
3.54 (8)
3.31 (10)
3.62 (8)
were in the patient's position
you would undergo the
surgery
Likely effect of disclosure of
3.49 (9)
3.41 (9)
3.51 (9)
risk on patient's health and
state of mind
Prospect of being sued if risk 3.39 (10)
3.53 (8)
3.34 (10)
were to materialize
Wishes expressed by patient's 2.86 (11)
2.75 (11)
2.90 (11)
close relatives
How good a relationship you 2.51 (12)
2.37 (13)
2.57 (12)
have with the patient
The common practice, if any, 2.47 (13)
2.55 (12)
2.44 (13)
of other doctors
How busy you are
1.67 (14)
1.69 (14)
1.66 (14)
*Number in brackets indicates order of ranking according to mean.
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The overall pattern of the results shown in Table F suggests that a
fairly paternalistic approach is adopted in practice. This can be seen
most clearly from the fact that respondents as a whole regarded the
"patient's best interests" as the most important factor, with far less
importance being accorded to "the fact that the patient would probably
regard the risk as relevant to his decision." The importance attached to
"the prognosis without surgery" also confirms this view. The decision in
Reibl v. Hughes does not appear to have had any significant impact in
this respect. Those respondents who were aware of the decision did not
accord high importance to the fact that the patient would regard the
risk as relevant, although they did attach less importance to the "best
interests" factor than respondents who were unaware of the decision.
Generally, however, the results were similar in both groups.
It is interesting to compare the results in Table F with those of
previous studies. The study conducted by Faden and her colleagues
demonstrated that the decision to disclose a risk is influenced greatly
by the extent of the risk, but not by the magnitude of harm which will
be suffered if the risk materializes. 48 Table F suggests that both of
these factors are highly influential. Faden's study also indicated that
the decision to disclose is influenced significantly by the perceived consequences of disclosure on the patient's health. 49 This finding is not
confirmed by the present study. The most recent American study indicates that the factors viewed as most relevant by American doctors are
the patient's ability to understand the information, his desire to be
given the information, and the seriousness of his condition.50 The present study suggests that only the last of these three factors ranks
amongst those viewed as most important by respondents as a whole.
Table F is also of interest with regard to the importance attached
to the risk of being sued as a factor influencing disclosure. Although
respondents as a whole attached little relative importance to this factor,
a significant minority of respondents did consider it to be of great importance. Thus, thirty-five percent of all respondents gave this factor a
"five" on the numerical scale provided. This confirms the findings of
previous studies, that approximately one-third of doctors regard the
prospect of being sued as one of the most important factors in deciding
whether to inform a patient of a risk involved in proposed treatment.5 1
48

Faden et al., supra note 2, at 267 - 68.

" Id. at 268.
50 Making Health Care Decisions, supra note 2, vol. I at 73.
51 See Rosoff, supra note 2, at 368.
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CONCLUSIONS

The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that Reibl v.
Hughes has had little impact on medical practice with regard to disclosure of risks to patients. The primary reason for this is ignorance of
the decision; seventy-five percent of respondents in the present study
were unaware of the Supreme Court decision. Moreover, even in the
case of respondents who were aware of the decision, most appeared not
to appreciate its importance. 5 These findings are consistent with previous studies in Canada and the United States, which reveal significant
ignorance of the law of informed consent amongst the medical profession,5 3 yet they are surprising given the attention paid to Reibl v.
Hughes in the national press, 54 in medical and medical-legal literature55 and, particularly, in the Annual Report of the Canadian Medical
Protective Association.5 6 Most doctors in Canada will have received a
copy of the CMPA Annual Report, yet its detailed coverage of Reibl v.
Hughes appears to have gone unnoticed by most members of the medical profession. This is unlikely to be due to a lack of interest in the
subject; indeed eighty percent of respondents in this study who were
unaware of Reibl v. Hughes accepted the offer of information summarizing the effect of the Supreme Court decision. It would seem that the
attempts to inform doctors of the decision have, so far, been inadequate
and further steps clearly are required to bring the implications of Reibl
v. Hughes to the attention of the medical profession in Canada.
This need is particularly acute given the study's finding that a majority of respondents expressed agreement with views which are incompatible with the main principles enunciated in Reibl v. Hughes.57 These
respondents felt that the decision to disclose any risks to a patient is
entirely a matter for the doctor's clinical judgment, and that he should
be guided more by what he thinks his patient ought to be told than by
what he thinks his patient would want to be told. The paternalism reflected in these opinions is also evident from respondents' views on what
factors are important in deciding whether to inform a patient of a particular risk involved in proposed surgery.
52 Section III C, supra.

"3See Magnet, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: A Description of Canadian Practices (1980), 4 Leg. Med. Q. -271 at 287; Rosoff, supra note 2, at 370 et seq.; Making
Health Care Decisions, supra note 2, vol. 1 at 105.
" See The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Oct. 9 1980.
" See, e.g., (1980), 123 C.M.AJ. 1167; (1980), 4 Leg. Med. Q. 209.
e Supra note 5.
57 Section IV B, supra.
" Section IV C, supra.
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The study also suggests that Reibl v. Hughes has had only a slight
impact on respondents who are aware of the decision. A majority of
these respondents (fifty-nine percent) indicated that the decision had
changed their practice with regard to informing patients. However, this
is not a reliable indication of the actual effect of Reibl v. Hughes,
given that the response was based on doctors' perceptions of the decision's effect on their practice. Indeed, considering reasons such as nonresponse bias59 and the existence of other factors affecting respondents'
practice, 0 this figure may exaggerate the impact of Reibl v. Hughes.
Moreover, the study demonstrates that, even in the case of respondents
who were aware of Reibl v. Hughes, approximately one-half held views
which are incompatible with the decision."" The fact that this figure
was only slightly lower than that of respondents unaware of the decision, suggests that the actual impact of Reibl v. Hughes on those aware
of the decision may be relatively small.
The present study therefore tends to confirm previous findings
which suggest that judicial decisions have little impact on the medical
profession.62 Although the main reason for this, in the present study, is
that the profession is generally unaware of Reibl v. Hughes, there remains the fact that even a majority of doctors who are aware of the
decision expressed views which are inconsistent with it. At first sight, it
might be possible to explain this finding in terms of a lack of awareness
of the full significance of Reibl v. Hughes. It will be recalled that a
majority of respondents who were aware of the decision did not appear
to appreciate its importance. 3 However, the study also revealed no significant variation in answers as between respondents who appreciated
the importance of the decision and those who did not.6 This suggests
that Reibl v. Hughes has failed to have any significant impact even on
those who were aware of both the decision and its importance.
This finding casts doubt over whether anything would be achieved
by making the medical profession more aware of the implications of
Reibl v. Hughes. It also provides evidence, not only of medical practitioners being impervious to change by judicial decision, 5 but more generally, of the impotence of law (and judicial decisions in particular) as
" Section II B, supra.
60 Section III E, supra.
e Section IV B, supra.
e' See, e.g., Wiley, The Impact of JudicialDecisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical
Study (1982), 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 345.
Sections III C, supra.
" Sections III D and IV B, supra.
65 See Wiley, supra note 62.
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an instrument of social change.68 Even assuming that the medical profession were to become aware of the implications of Reibl v. Hughes, to
suggest that this would have any meaningful effect, such as doctors
becoming "more sensitive, concerned and humane,"8 7 is to attribute to
judicial decisions in general, and to Reibl v. Hughes in particular, a
degree of influence which they probably do not possess.

U See in particular, Griffiths, Is Law Important? (1979), 54 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 339; Epstein,
The Social Consequences or Common Law Rules (1982), 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1717.
47 Supra note 6.

